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Massachusetts Lobstermen’s Association v. Ross, ___ F. Supp. 3d ___,
2018 U.S. Dist. Lexis 172151, 2018 WL 4853901 (D.D.C. Oct. 5, 2018)
Daniel M. Brister
President Obama established the first––and only––national
monument in the Atlantic Ocean on September 15, 2016. Located 130
miles southeast of Cape Cod, Massachusetts, and comprised of 4,913
square miles of marine ecosystems rich in biodiversity, the protected area
includes four underwater mountains and three submarine canyons.
Plaintiff commercial lobster and fishing associations, seeking to overturn
the designation, asserted that the Antiquities Act does not permit a
president to establish marine national monuments. The U.S. District Court
for the District of Columbia disagreed, upholding a president’s authority
to protect offshore areas and vast ecosystems as objects of scientific
interest, and dismissing the Lobstermen’s case in a memorandum opinion
splashed with maritime references.
I. INTRODUCTION
Massachusetts Lobstermen’s Association v. Ross examined
whether President Obama exceeded his authority under the Antiquities Act
of 1906 (“Antiquities Act” or “Act”) in establishing the Northeast
Canyons and Seamounts Marine National Monument (“Monument”).1
Claiming injury from commercial fishing restrictions implemented under
the Monument’s management plan, the Massachusetts Lobstermen’s
Association and other fishing associations (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) filed
suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia,
seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the President, the
Secretaries of Interior and Commerce, and the Chairman of the Council on
Environmental Quality (collectively, “Defendants”).2
In arguing the President exceeded his authority under the
Antiquities Act, Plaintiffs challenged textual definitions of terms within
the Act and the breadth of the area set aside for the Monument.3
Defendants refuted those allegations, asked the court to dismiss the case
as nonjusticiable, and asserted the President did not exceed the statutory
authority granted to him under the Antiquities Act.4 Upon review, the court
determined Plaintiffs failed to prove the President exceeded his powers
under the Act and issued a memorandum opinion dismissing the case.5

1.
Mass. Lobstermen's Ass'n v. Ross, ___ F. Supp. 3d ___, 2018 U.S.
Dist. Lexis 172151, 2018 WL 4853901, at *5 (D.D.C. Oct. 5, 2018).
2.
Id. at *6-9.
3.
Id. at *4-9 (quoting 54 U.S.C. § 320301(b) (2012)).
4.
Id.
5.
Id. at *14.
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II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Congress passed the Antiquities Act in 1906, granting the
President the authority to proclaim “objects of historic or scientific
interest” as national monuments.6 Since President Theodore Roosevelt’s
utilization of the Antiquities Act to preserve the Grand Canyon in 1908,
courts and presidents have interpreted the Act to allow the withdrawal and
protection of vast tracts of land owned or controlled by the federal
government based on their cultural or scientific value.7 In all, presidents
have declared 157 national monuments of varying size and purpose.8
In October 2016, President Obama established the Monument in
the northwestern Atlantic Ocean, in part to protect a diverse array of
marine creatures and habitats, including corals, squid, octopus, whales,
tuna, billfish, and sharks.9 As part of the Monument designation, Obama
directed the Secretaries of Interior and Commerce to develop a
management plan for the Monument within three years.10 More notably,
however, he required the Secretaries of Interior and Commerce to
encourage scientific research and exploration, prohibit oil and gas
exploration, and restrict commercial fishing within the Monument.11
Concerned with such economic restrictions, Defendants brought suit in
March 2017.12
III. ANALYSIS
Plaintiffs, in challenging President Obama’s statutory authority to
declare the Monument, advanced three overarching arguments.13 First, that
Congress, in granting the President the right to protect “lands” as national
monuments under the Antiquities Act, did not intend for marine
ecosystems or areas of ocean to qualify for the Act’s protections.14 Second,
that the Monument, which lies more than 130 miles off the coast of New
England, is not under the complete control of the United States, as required
by the Antiquities Act.15 Finally, Plaintiffs argued that the Monument is
overly large and therefore in violation of the Antiquities Act’s requirement
that monuments be limited to the smallest area necessary for their proper
management and protection.16

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Id. at *5.
Id. at *4-6.
Id. at *5.
Id. at *7.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *9.
Id. at *4.
Id. at *15.
Id. at *27.
Id. at *46.
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A. Oceans as “Lands” Under the Antiquities Act
Citing Antiquities Act language allowing the President to
establish monuments on “lands” controlled by the federal government,
Plaintiffs argued that oceans are not lands as mentioned in the Act, and
therefore fall outside its scope.17 After acknowledging the initial appeal of
this argument, the court nevertheless found itself “buffeted by the strong
winds of Supreme Court precedent, executive practice, and ordinary
meaning.”18 Citing three U.S. Supreme Court decisions, the district court
held that submerged lands and their overlying waters may indeed be
considered “lands” under the Antiquities Act.19
The court also relied on numerous instances where presidents
withdrew submerged lands as part of national monument designations
without Congressional objection.20 According to the court, examples of
such unchallenged national monument creations abound, including
Devil’s Hole, Channel Islands, Glacier Bay, Fort Jefferson, Buck Island
Reef, and the Papahānaumokuākea Marine Monument.21 The court
interpreted these monuments as evidence of presidential authority to
protect submerged lands under the Antiquities Act.22
Finally, the court turned to the plain meaning of the word “land,”
citing several dictionary definitions to show that the term includes not only
dry land, but also lands on the seafloor.23 Moreover, the district court
offered a particularly relevant quote from the Supreme Court: “Lands are
not the less land for being covered with water.”24 Finding the issue well
settled, the court held that “[t]he Antiquities Act reaches lands both dry
and wet.”25
Plaintiffs next asserted the Antiquities Act does not apply to
maritime areas because: (1) the National Marine Sanctuaries Act
(“NMSA”) impliedly repealed the Antiquities Act with respect to
maritime areas; and (2) that, in passing the NMSA, Congress tacitly
17.
Id.
18.
Id. at *15.
19.
Id.; Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 138-42 (1976)
(providing that a pool of water and the underlying groundwater within the Death
Valley National Monument were subject to the president’s power under the Act);
United States v. California, 436 U.S. 32, 33 (1978) (“Although the Antiquities Act
refers to ‘lands,’ . . . it also authorizes the reservation of waters located on or over
federal lands.”); Alaska v. United States, 545 U.S. 75, 103 (2005) (“It is clear . . . that
the Antiquities Act empowers the President to reserve submerged lands.”).
20.
Id. at *18.
21.
Id.
22.
Id. at *19.
23.
Id. at *20.
24.
Id. at *20-21 (quoting Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 176 U.S. 646,
660 (1900)) (emphasis in original).
25.
Id. at *21.
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declared the Antiquities Act only relevant to terrestrial areas. 26 The court,
liberally employing maritime metaphors, found that “[n]either argument .
. . holds water.”27 First, the court cited Watt v. Alaska, which held
unfavorable “repeals by implication.”28 Although statutory repeals may be
inferred when a subsequent statute explicitly contradicts an existing one,
the court noted that, in addition to the NMSA’s failure to mention the
Antiquities Act, the NMSA’s express intent is to “complement[] existing
regulatory authorities.”29 As for Plaintiffs’ second contention of the
Antiquities Act’s singularly terrestrial relevance, the court found it
“provide[d] the Lobstermen’s boat little headway” because subsequent
acts may confer additional protections without rendering existing acts
meaningless.30 Finding the Antiquities Act unaffected by the subsequent
enactment of the NMSA, the court rejected Plaintiffs’ notion that the
“Monument exceed[ed] the President’s authority under the Antiquities Act
because it lies entirely beneath the waves.”31
B. Government Control of the Lands at Issue
Plaintiffs’ next argument “haul[ed] in no more catch” than the
previous one,32 wherein Plaintiffs maintained that the Monument was
invalid because the Antiquities Act only gives the President authority to
establish national monuments on “lands owned or controlled by the
Federal Government.”33 Where the previous argument centered on the
definition of “lands,” this one focused on the words “owned or
controlled.”34 Plaintiffs urged a narrow interpretation of “control” as
meaning “complete control” and asserted that the government lacked such
control over the Exclusive Economic Zone (“EEZ”), which extends to 200
miles from the coast.35
Returning to the dictionary to demonstrate common usage of the
word “control” contemplates something less than absolute dominion,36 the
court held that establishment of the EEZ37 and passage of the Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act conveyed adequate control of the oceanic
lands at issue to permit their protection under the Antiquities Act as a
national monument.38 In assessing the adequacy of the government’s
control over the EEZ, the court considered three points.39 First, the
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38
39.

Id.
Id. at *22.
Id. (quoting Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259 at 267 (1981)).
Id. (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1431(b)(2)).
Id.
Id. at *27.
Id.
Id. (quoting 54 U.S.C. § 320301(a)).
Id.
Id. at *37.
Id. at *28.
Id. at *37.
Id. at *35 (citing 43 U.S.C. § 1331(a)).
Id. at *36.
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government’s regulation of fisheries and resource extractive industries
within the EEZ evinced substantial control.40 Second, the government’s
specific authority to regulate the area for purposes of environmental
conservation revealed a strong level of control.41 Third, no other entity or
person exerted an equal measure of control over the EEZ as did the U.S.
government.42 According to the court, these three considerations, taken
together, demonstrate that “the federal government controls the EEZ for
purposes of the Antiquities Act.”43

Deleted:

C. Smallest Area Compatible with Proper Care and Management
Finally, Plaintiffs argued that the Monument’s boundaries
violated the Act’s “smallest compatible area”44 stipulation because they
“b[ore] little relation to the canyons and seamounts” themselves and
“encompass[ed] areas that are dozens of miles from the nearest
seamount.”45 In other words, Plaintiffs claimed the Monument protects
excessive areas of ocean outside the specific features named in the
presidential proclamation establishing the Monument.46 Going a step
further, they also asserted that ecosystems and natural features are not
“objects” under the Antiquities Act and their inclusion in the Monument
exceeded the Act’s authority.47
The court rejected these arguments because Plaintiffs incorrectly
assumed the canyons and seamounts were the only areas worthy of
protection.48 According to the court, the presidential proclamation clearly
established that the canyons, seamounts, and the “natural resources and
ecosystems in and around them” constituted “objects of historic and
scientific interest” under the Act.49 The court cited both D.C. Circuit and
U.S. Supreme Court precedent in support of its assertion that large
ecosystems, rather than just individual objects of curiosity, are worthy of
protection under the Antiquities Act.50 In granting the government’s
motion to dismiss, the court held that, just as President Roosevelt had acted
within his authority under the Antiquities Act in establishing Grand
Canyon National Monument in 1908, so had President Obama acted within
his authority in establishing the Canyons and Seamounts National
Monument in 2016.51
40.
Id. at *37.
41.
Id.
42.
Id. at *40.
43.
Id. at *42.
44.
Id. at *45 (quoting 54 U.S.C. § 320301(b)).
45.
Id. at *47.
46.
Id.
47.
Id. at *48.
48.
Id. at *49.
49.
Id. at *47.
50.
Id. at *48 (citing Alaska, 545 U.S. at 103; Cappaert, 426 U.S. at
141-142; Cameron v. United States, 252 U.S. 450, 455-456 (1920); Tulare County v.
Bush, 306 F.3d 1138, 1142 (D.C. Cir. 2002)).
51.
Id. at *4.
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IV. CONCLUSION
At a time of significant uncertainty for the Antiquities Act, Massachusetts
Lobstermen’s Association v. Ross nonetheless represents an affirmation of
the Act’s authority and breadth. This district court decision is momentous,
both because of its determination of executive authority to establish
national monuments at sea, and by its affirmation of presidential authority
to protect vast ecosystems as objects of scientific interest under the
Antiquities Act. Because the decision is likely to be appealed to the Court
of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, it has the potential—along with the
ongoing litigation over Bears Ears and Escalante National Monuments—
to have a profound effect on the future of the Antiquities Act. Despite the
conclusion’s delivery via memorandum opinion, the holding could have a
watershed impact on the future management of lands owned or controlled
by the federal government, both on- and off-shore.
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